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Young: Papciak v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.--The Case for a Borrowing Stat

PAPCIAK V. RICHARDSON-MERRELL INC.THE CASE FOR A BORROWING STATUTE
I. SCOPE

In Byrd v. BZue Ridge Rural EZectric Co-operative1 the Supreme Court of the United States established a new test for
determining if state procedural rules were to be followed in
federal courts. The test comprehended the doctrine of "countervailing federal considerations:" state procedure would be followed in federal courts if the state policy reasons for such
procedure outweighed the federal considerations against applying
it and in favor of using another procedure.
The Fourth Circuit in zantay v. Beeck Aircraft Corp.2 applied the rationale of Byrd and concluded that a state statute3
designed to close the door of the state courts to non-residents
suing foreign corporations on causes of action arising outside the
state, the subject matter of which is also outside the state,
would not bar such an action from a federal court sitting within
the state. This decision was relied upon in Papciao v. Richardson-Mferrel Inc., 4 a recent unreported case in the District Court
of South Carolina. In Papciaki the court followed &zantay in
allowing a plaintiff to choose a favorable statute of limitations
and at the same time to bar the application of the state door
closing statute.
The problem is best posed by assuming the following facts.
Doe, a resident of Pennsylvania, was struck by a truck in
Kentucky. The truck belonged to Acme Movers, a Delaware
corporation doing business in all states. By the time Doe brought
an action against Acme in Kentucky, the Kentucky statute of
limitations had run. In the Kentucky forum, therefore, Doe had
no remedy: likewise, in Pennsylvania, his residence, the statute
of limitations had run. The practical question remaining is
1. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
2. 349 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1965).

3. In South Carolina the "door closing" statute provides:
An action against a corporation created by or under the
laws of any other state, government or country may be brought
in the circuit court: (1) By any resident of this State for any
cause of action; or (2) By a plaintiff not a resident of
this State when the cause of action shall have arisen or the
subject of the action shall be situated within this State.
S.C. CODE ATN. § 10-214 (1962).
4. No. 67-219 (D.S.C., Jan. 24, 1968).
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whether Doe may now choose another forum to bring his suit.
It is this consideration which illustrates the implications of
Szantay and Papciak.
It is the purpose of this note to bring these implications to
light and to explore alternatives to the reasoning and solutions
offered in these cases.
II. BAcEOXGiooND

The necessary foundation for a grasp of this problem of choosing state forums includes at the minimum some understanding of
Erie Railroad v. TompkinY and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.6
Erie held that state substantive law is controlling upon a federal
court sitting in that state whether or not the law was formulated
by the legislature or the courts of the state. A great deal of
confusion evolved from the elusive distinction between substantive and procedural law. In York the Supreme Court held
that if the outcome of the case would be substantially affected
by following state procedure, then the federal court could not
7
apply federal procedure but must adhere to state procedure.
Byrd v. BZue Ridge Rural Electric Co-operative modified the
position taken in York. In Byrd the question was whether, in a
workmen's compensation case, a judge rather than a jury was to
make certain factual determinations. The South Carolina court
had ruled that in such cases 9 it was reversible error to allow
the questions in dispute to be determined by a jury. The question
in Byrd was whether the federal court should follow the state
procedure and allow the presiding judge to decide the factual
issues or to turn this duty over to the jury as was the procedure
in federal courts.
The Supreme Court could find no strong state policy reason
for the South Carolina court's holding. Since the outcome of
this case was not substantially affected by allowing the jury
rather than the judge to be the trier of fact, the countervailing
5. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

6. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). For a discussion of this problem see Ziegler,
Knowlton, Gibbs & Randall. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, Revisited, 17 S.C.L.
REv. 467 (1965): C. WRIGHT, FED.A CouRTs 187-218 (1963).

7. 326 U.S. at 109-10.
8. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
9. E.g., Horton v. Baruch, 217 S.C. 48, 59 S.E2d 545 (1950) ; Younginer
v. J.O. Jones Constr. Co., 215 S.C. 135, 54 S.E.2d 545 (1949); Holland v.
Georgia Hardwood Lumber Co., 214 S.C. 195, 51 S.E.2d 744 (1949); Gordon
v. Hollywood-Beaufort Package Corp., 213 S.C. 438, 49 S.E.2d 718 (1948).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol21/iss1/8

2

Young: Papciak v. Richardson-Merrell Inc.--The Case for a Borrowing Stat
SoUTH CAEoLNA LAw REvImw

[VbI. 21

federal considerations which were present would take precedence.
The countervailing federal consideration in this case was the
federal constitutional right to a jury trial. This doctrine can be
more easily understood upon an examination of Siantay.
&zantay involved a suit against Beech Aircraft Corporation,
a Delaware corporation, by non-residents of South Carolina in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
South Carolina. On April 1, 1962, Szantay and all the passengers
aboard his private airplane were killed when the plane crashed
in Tennessee. The plane was en route to Chicago, Illinois, from
a servicing stopover in Columbia, South Carolina. All of the
victims were citizens of Illinois.
It was alleged that the deaths were caused by the negligence
of Beech in both the manufacture and design of the aircraft
and the negligent servicing of Dixie Aviation Co. while the
plane was in Columbia. Beech moved for a dismissal "on the
ground that a federal diversity court sitting in South Carolina
lacks jurisdiction over Beech because of South Carolina's 'doorclosing' statute .

. . ."-1

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,

in an opinion by Judge Sobeloff considered this question of
following state procedure in federal courts and in so doing made
the following conclusions:
1. If the state provision, (here the door closing statute)
whether legislatively adopted or judicially declared, is
the substantive right or obligation at issue, it is constitutionally controlling.
2. If the state provision is a procedure intimately bound
up with the state right or obligation, it is likewise constitutionally controlling.
3. If the state procedural provision is not intimately
bound up with the right being enforced but its application would substantially affect the outcome of the
litigation, the federal diversity court must still apply
it unless there are affirmative countervailing federal
considerations. This is not deemed a constitutional
requirement but one dictated by comity. 1
Both sides in the litigation conceded that the "door closing"
statute was procedural and that since the substantive rights
10. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1965).
11. Id. at 63, 64.
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asserted arose under Tennessee law, according to a South
Carolina conflict of laws rule,12 the South Carolina procedural
rule could therefore not be intimately bound up with that right.
These conclusions left open only alternative number three:
would applying the state procedural provision "substantially
affect the outcome of the litigation?"
It is obvious that in using the state procedural rule the outcome
will be substantially altered: the "door closing" statute would
prevent the plaintiff from maintaining his suit in any state court
and if applied in federal court would have the same result. However, this analysis requires the application of one more criterion
-the test of "countervailing federal considerations." In applying that test the fourth circuit could find no state policy reason
underlying the South Carolina "door closing" statute. The court
suggested several policy reasons which could have been the basis
of the statute but found that at most "the state's reason for
enacting its 'door closing' statute is uncertain."1 3 Balanced
against this uncertainty were explicit federal considerations, the
strongest being the purpose of Article III, section 2 of the
United States Constitution to avoid discrimination against nonresident litigants. The court conceded that South Carolina's
"door closing" statute did not violate the Constitution, but this
was not enough to deter the court from determining that the
federal considerations more than countervailed the unclear state
policy.
From Byrd, which decided what procedural rule would be
followed in a federal court, to &zantay, which using the same
reasoning as Byrd, determined that a case could in fact be
entertained in federal court although it would not be heard in
the state court, was a determinative step in the progression
toward the problem which was ultimately to be framed in
Papciak.
Papciak involved the sale of drugs in the state of Pennsylvania
by Richardson-Merrell, a national drug firm. Papciak, a citizen
of Pennsylvania, was injured when he took one of the drugs
12. See generally Randall, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws, 17

S.C.L Rnv. 494 (1965). On the South Carolina rule see Rauton v. Pullman
Co., 183 S.C. 495, 191 S.E. 416 (1937); Smith v. Southern Ry. Co., 87 S.C
136, 69 S.E. 18 (1910), which state generally that recovery on tort is deter-

sined by the law of state wherein injury was sustained.
13. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 65 (4th Cir. 1965).
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manufactured by Richardson-Merrell. He failed to bring suit
in Pennsylvania within that state's two year statute of limitations

for torts. 1 4 Sometime after the Pennsylvania statute had run

but before six years had elapsed, the action was brought in the
District Court of South Carolina. The court ruled that it had
jurisdiction over the cause of action and issued an order to that
effect. An interlocutory appeal to the fourth circuit was refused. 1 The result, which was to allow a federal court to use
one state procedural rule and seemingly ignore another state
procedural rule, seemed to present an unjustifiable situation.
The district court's basis for its order was found in alternative
number three of Judge Sobeloff's &zantayopinion. The "door
closing" statute was "countervailed" by federal considerations.
The federal considerations were the same as in Szantay; particularly the concern of the federal court about discrimination
between residents and non-residents in a state's courts. In its
immediate impact Papaiak seems to mirror the Szantay determination as to which procedure is to be followed. On closer
examination, however, the issue of which state's statute of
limitations is to prevail, while present in Papiak,never arose
in Szantay and operates to distinguish the two cases.
To more fully understand the situation, a discussion of the
two "door closing" cases which have been decided in the Supreme
Court will be helpful. In AngeZ v. Bullington,16 Bullington, a
citizen of Virginia, sold land situated in Virginia to Angel, a
citizen of North Carolina. The transaction involved a series of
notes running from Angel to Bullington, which were secured by
a deed of trust on the land transferred. Upon default by Angel,
Bullington called upon the trustees to sell the land and apply the
proceeds to the notes due. After this was done, Bullington sued
for the deficiency still remaining in the Superior Court of
Macon County, North Carolina, and was met by a demurrer on
the grounds that North Carolina law precluded recovery of such
a deficiency judgment. The statute prohibited obtaining a
deficiency judgment after the execution of powers in a deed of
trust. 17 The North Carolina Supreme Court 18 held that the
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 34 (1953). This two year statute was held
applicable, rather than the six year limitation under title 12, § 31 for breach of
warranty or contract, in an action for claims resulting from the injection of an
allegedly defective antibiotic supplied for injection into the bodies of human
beings. Ravetz v. Upjohn Co., 138 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
15. Misc. No. 500 (4th Cir., filed March 5, 1968).
16. 330 U. S. 183 (1947).

17. Id. at 185.
18. Angel v. Bullington, 220 N.C. 18, 16 S.E.2d 411 (1941).
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statute barred Bullington's suit, even though such a result
effectively shut the doors of all North Carolina state courts to
Bullington. Bullington then brought his action to federal court,
where he was allowed to prosecute the suit.19 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed. 20 The Supreme Court reversed on
certiorari.2 1

The High Court's decision was based on two distinct elements,
the first being that the North Carolina Supreme Court decision
was res judicata. In its second line of reasoning the court
stated that it would be "incongruous" to assume that the North
Carolina court and legislature intended to close all remedies in
state courts to its citizens in similar cases while leaving the door
open to citizens of other states in the federal courts of North
Carolina. Another reason given for reversal was that a statute
upheld by the highest court of the state is expressive of state
policy and that
[t]he essence of diversity jurisdiction is that a federal
court enforces state law and state policy ....

What is

more important, diversity jurisdiction must follow state
law and policy. A federal court in North Carolina,
when involved on grounds of diversity of citizenship,
cannot give that which North Carolina has withheld.
Availability of diversity jurisdiction.., is not to effect
22
discrimination against the great body of local citizens.
The second case, -Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.23 involved an
action in the district court sitting in Mississippi, by a Tennessee
corporation, against a resident of ississippi for brokers commission allegedly due for sale of real estate situated in Mississippi. The district court held that since the Tennessee corporation
had not qualified to do business in Mississippi it could not avail
itself of Mississippi state courts. The district court dismissed
with prejudice. The court of appeals reversed, relying upon
David Luptons' Bons (o. v. Automobile Club of Ameria, 24 a
case which the Supreme Court in Angel had announced as
"obsolete. 25
19. Id., 56 F. Supp. 372 (W.D.N.C. 1944).

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.,
Id.,
Id.,
337

150 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1945).
326 U.S. 713 (1946).
330 U.S. 183, 191-192 (1947).
U. S. 535 (1949).

24. 225 U.S. 489 (1912).

25. 330 U.S. at 192.
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The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the suit by the
Tennessee corporation was barred in federal as well as state
courts in Mississippi. The Court went on to say that to hold
otherwise would be to discriminate in favor of a non-citizen in
diversity actions and that "it was that element of discrimination
'26
that Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins was designed to eliminate.
In Szantay and Papciak the South Carolina "door closing"
statute was held to limit state jurisdiction over all causes of
action arising outside of the state against foreign corporations,
not for all plaintiffs, but only for non-resident plaintiffs;
27
whereas the same law was applied to all litigants in Angel. In

Woods the non-resident plaintiff corporation was made subject
to the same burdens as a domestic corporation as a prerequisite
to entertain a suit in the courts of Mississippi. To hold otherwise
than to disallow the suit in federal court would permit the
action, and thereby result in discrimination in favor of nonresident corporations, allowing them to enjoy an immunity
unavailable to domestic corporations.
It was also contended that there was no practical reason for
diversity jurisdiction in Papciak as there was in Szantay. In
Szantay, South Carolina was the only forum in which all parties
to the action could be joined, for no other forum could obtain
jurisdiction over Dixie Aviation, the South Carolina corporation.
No such consideration was present in Papciak; yet this type of
reasoning, although persuasive on its face, has no basis when
applied to the tests set forth by Judge Sobeloff in Szantay.
The defendant, after failing to distinguish Papciak from
oods and similar cases, at&zantay in order to apply Angel,
that
position
tempted to establish the
[i]n any event, the plaintiff can suggest no plausible
basis for his incongrous contention that he is entitled to
ignore one South Carolina statute to revive his action,
otherwise barred under the 28law of his home state of
Pennsylvania where it arose.
Trying still another tack, the defendant submitted that South
Carolina's "door closing" statute may be an expression of a rule
of forum non conveniens, which if true could require the federal
26. Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (1949).
27. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief on Motion to Dismiss at 5, Papciak v.

Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 67-219 (D.S.C., Jan. 24, 1968).

28. Defendants' Supplemental Brief on Motion to Dismiss at 3, Papciak v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 67-219 (D.S.C., Jan. 24, 1968).
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court sitting in Pennsylvania, due to change in venue, to apply
Pennsylvania law rather than South Carolina law. To apply
South Carolina law would be to ignore the manifest state desire
not to entertain the case in any manner. This application of
Pennsylvania law would result from the obligation of the federal
court to determine how the South Carolina court would dispose
of a case, jurisdiction over which had been pointedly denied.
Would South Carolina in such a situation apply its own statute
of limitations?. The defendant contended it would not and that
it would be reasonable to assume the "contact of action theory"2 9
would be applicable. This theory advances the proposition that
the law of the site of the greatest number of "contacts" with
the action should prevail.
Perhaps the stronger argument is based on the federal policy
against forum shopping. This policy was evident in Erie. "The
Erie decision was also in part a reaction to the practice of
'forum shopping' which had grown up in response to the rule of
Swift v. Tyson."3 °
Logically, a "forum shopping" argument would give strong
support for enforcing a state "door closing" statute. However, to
assert this position on the basis of previous cases which had
dealt with the matter of forum shopping would be to build on a
flawed foundation. In the past the forum shopping discussion
has referred to the choice between federal and state courts sitting
within a given state and not federal courts sitting in different
states.
Federal court forum shopping has apparently been approved,
at least after a fashion. In Yan Dusem v. Barrack"' it was
stated:
Of course these cases allow plaintiffs to retain whatever advantages may flow from the state laws of the
forum they have initially selected. There is nothing
however, in the language or policy of Section 1404(a)8 2
to justify its use by defendants to defeat the advantages
accruing to plaintiffs who have chosen a forum which,
although it was inconvenient was a proper venue ....
29. For a complete discussion of this theory see Note, The Grouping of
Contacts-An Innovation In The Conflict of Laws, 18 S.C.L. Rev. 453 (1966).
30. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965).

31. 376 U.S. 612 (1964).

32. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).

For the convenience of parties and wit-

nesses and in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.
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In passing Section 1404(a) Congress was primarily
concerned with the problems arising where, despite the
propriety of the plaintiffs' venue selection, the chosen
forum was an inconvenient one . . . . Section 1404(a)
was not designed to narrow the plaintiffs' venue privilege or to defeat the state-law advantages that might
accrue from the exercise of this venue privilege . . .3
This apparent approval was not rendered in a situation analologous to Papiak; however, it seemed to be persuasive in the
district court order:
Having selected South Carolina as the forum for bringing his action, plaintiff is entitled to whatever benefits
may flow from the laws of the state. Under South
Carolina law the law of the forum governs the statute
of limitations to be applied. Accordingly, in changing
venue to Pennsylvania, the South Carolina Statute of
84
Limitation should apply.

IV. Coor sio
Restating briefly the controlling view of Szantay and Papiak:
When a non-resident plaintiff sues a foreign corporation on a
cause of action arising outside of the forum state and that
state has a "door closing" statute, that statute will not be effective in keeping the litigation out of federal courts in the state
because of countervailing federal considerations, i.e., discrimination between residents and non-residents. Once the case is in
a federal court, that court must look to the state's conflict of
laws rule to determine what law is to be applied. So even in
ignoring the state's procedural "door closing" statute, the federal
court may, depending upon the state conflicts rule, enforce the
forum state's statute of limitations. This will remain true even
if for some reason venue is changed in accordance with section

1401(a).
A practical solution to this problem in South Carolina lies in
the state's adopting different conflict of laws rules to apply

33. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 633-34 (1964).
34. Order at 4, Papiak v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 67-219 (D.S.C.,
Jan. 24, 1968).
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when litigation is solely between non-residents.3 5 Such different
conflict of laws rules could be effected by means of what is
commonly called a "borrowing statute." In this case a borrowing
statute would have operated to make the Pennsylvania statute
of limitations applicable in the federal court in South Carolina
and thereby to have barred the action in the federal court.
Based upon existing law, however, the outcome of Papiao is
eminently correct. Although at first blush it seems unreasonable
to allow the fifty states of the United States to become market
places for favorable statutes of limitations, this is not necessarily
the result. Each state may adopt "borrowing statutes," but until
they do, the right of the plaintiff to choose the forum and all
benefits flowing to the plaintiff because of that choice must be
upheld. The right of "forum choosing" must not be confused
with the abuse of "forum shopping."
ROBERT YoUNG

35. Another solution could possibly have been obtained had the court in
Szantay followed the earlier South Carolina case of Lightfoot v. Atlantic Coast
Line ThR., 33 F2d 765 (E.D.S.C. 1929). In that case an action was brought
in the state court by a non-resident against a foreign railway company. Defendant demurred on jurisdictional grounds on removal to the federal court and
the demurrer was sustained. The court held that it would consider itself bound
by the interpretation of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Central R.R. &
Banking Co. v. Georgia Constr. & Inv. Co., 32 S.C. 319, 11 S.E. 192 (1890),

which held that a non-resident could sue a foreign corporation only in the two
instances specified in the door closing statute. The jurisdiction granted to the
federal courts was said to be derivative and therefore that federal courts should
adhere to South Carolina law.
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